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Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception 
(Forthcoming, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. ___ (2017)) 
Peter J. Smith* and Robert W. Tuttle** 
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Court recognized a 
ministerial exception to the ordinary rules of employer liability. The 
Court also concluded that the exception operates as an affirmative 
defense rather than a jurisdictional bar. This conclusion raises quite 
significant questions about how courts should address the exception in 
the course of litigation.  
We argue that courts should approach these procedural questions 
in light of the underlying justification for the ministerial exception. The 
exception reflects a longstanding constitutional limitation on the 
competence of courts to resolve “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” 
questions. To conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative 
defense does not alter this fundamental limitation on the authority of 
secular courts.  
As a practical matter, this means that in litigation between 
religious institutions and their employees, courts may be required to 
manage discovery to resolve threshold questions about the application 
of the ministerial exception before permitting broader discovery. 
Similarly, courts should consider permitting interlocutory appeals of 
trial court decisions that deny motions for summary judgment based on 
the exception. And courts not only should conclude that religious 
institutions do not waive the defense by failing to raise it, but also ought 
to raise it sua sponte when the facts indicate that the exception may 
apply. These departures from the ordinary treatment of affirmative 
defenses are necessary to respect the constitutional principles that the 
Court articulated in Hosanna-Tabor. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
** Berz Research Professor of Law & Religion, George Washington University Law 
School.  
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In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,1 the Court for the first 
time recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception” to the 
ordinary rules of liability arising out of the employment relationship 
between clergy and religious institutions. The Court concluded that the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment “bar the government from 
interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its 
ministers.” 2  As a consequence, a minister generally cannot recover 
from her religious employer for employment discrimination or related 
claims. Although the Court in Hosanna-Tabor declined to articulate a 
clear test for determining when an employee is a minister, it concluded 
that the plaintiff in the suit was a minister for purposes of the 
exception.3 
Before the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the lower courts 
had divided over whether the ministerial exception deprived courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider a ministerial employee’s claims 
or instead operated as a defense to liability.4 The Court resolved this 
debate in a footnote in its opinion in Hosanna-Tabor. 5  The Court 
declared that the exception operates as an affirmative defense, rather 
than as a jurisdictional bar. 6  In this paper, we address both the 
underlying justification for this conclusion and its practical 
consequences. 
To understand the significance of these questions, it is useful to 
consider a hypothetical suit. Imagine that an African-American, female 
minister served a congregation for several years without any 
complaints. With virtually no notice, the church council, composed 
exclusively of white men, recently voted to fire her, pursuant to their 
authority under the church’s governing documents. They explained to 
the minister that they were terminating her because of the poor 
quality of her sermons and their perception that her prayers 
increasingly departed from settled doctrines of the faith tradition. The 
discharged minister responded by filing a claim with the local office of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging 
1 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
2 Id. at 181. 
3 Id. at 190 (“We are reluctant [to] adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an 
employee qualifies as a minister.  It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case 
involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the 
circumstances of her employment.”).   
4 See infra at notes 39-48 and accompanying text. 
5 565 U.S. at 195 n.4. 
6 Id. 
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discrimination on the basis of race and gender. The EEOC declined to 
become involved in the suit and granted the minister a “right-to-sue” 
letter. She then filed suit in federal district court seeking back pay, 
reinstatement, and attorney’s fees.   
 In a typical employment discrimination suit, where the plaintiff 
demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer can 
respond by offering a non-discriminatory justification for the adverse 
employment action. The plaintiff can then argue that the employer’s 
proffered justification is pre-textual, and the finder of fact must 
determine the actual basis for the adverse employment decision. 7 
Matters are more complicated when the defendant is a religious 
organization. Title VII, and comparable state-law protections against 
employment discrimination, provides that religious organizations are 
not bound by the prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of 
religion.8 Accordingly, an avowed atheist cannot recover under Title 
VII for religious discrimination when a church refuses to hire him, 
even if the position is not one that involves leading worship, religious 
education, or any other religious activity.9  
 In our hypothetical suit, the plaintiff does not allege that she 
was fired for religious reasons, nor could she successfully maintain 
such an action against the church. But Title VII, like comparable state 
provisions, does not exempt religious organizations from the general 
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race, gender, 
national origin, or the other protected characteristics under the 
statute.   
 If there were no ministerial exception to liability under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, then the plaintiff could force the defendant to 
articulate a non-discriminatory basis for her termination. If the 
plaintiff could satisfy her initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie 
case of race or gender discrimination, the burden would shift to the 
church to articulate a non-discriminatory basis for the decision. In our 
example, the church likely would defend by citing the council’s 
conclusion that she was a poor preacher and deviated from settled 
church doctrine. The plaintiff would respond by arguing that those 
reasons were pre-textual, which she would seek to demonstrate by 
                                                 
7 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (“This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of 
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by 
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.” 
9 See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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offering evidence that her preaching was adequate and that her 
prayers and teaching conformed to church doctrine.   
To resolve such a dispute, a court would inevitably be required 
to decide whether the plaintiff was an adequate preacher and whether 
her teaching and prayers were sufficiently orthodox. But even before 
Hosanna-Tabor, there was a long and unbroken constitutional 
tradition that prohibits courts from resolving “strictly ecclesiastical” 
questions,10 and it is difficult to imagine a more purely ecclesiastical 
question than the quality or substance of a minister’s preaching and 
teaching. As we explain below, this is the strongest theoretical and 
constitutional justification for the ministerial exception. 
But even assuming the existence of such an exception, 
important questions remain in suits by church employees against the 
church. As in Hosanna-Tabor, it may be unclear whether the employee 
should be treated as a minister for purposes of the exception. In 
addition, as we discuss below, some claims by employees properly 
considered ministers might nevertheless be the basis for recovery 
notwithstanding the exception.   
This state of affairs raises several procedural questions in suits 
potentially implicating the ministerial exception. To return to our 
example, imagine that the plaintiff were not an ordained pastor, but 
instead was the publicist for a large church congregation, responsible 
for designing and editing the church’s many publications and for 
maintaining the church’s elaborate website. 11  It would not be 
immediately obvious whether she is a minister within the meaning of 
the exception. If she sued for race and gender discrimination after 
being terminated, and the church responded by raising the ministerial 
exception, what mechanism should the court use to decide whether the 
exception insulates the church from liability?   
We focus in this paper on five important questions of procedure 
that can arise in a suit implicating the ministerial exception. First, 
does the religious organization properly assert the exception by way of 
a motion to dismiss, or may it only raise the defense in its answer and 
then seek to resolve the suit by way of a motion for summary 
judgment? Second, if the matter is not properly resolved at the motion 
to dismiss stage, should a defense based on the ministerial exception 
require the court to limit the scope of discovery to matters relevant to 
10 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871); see also Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-49 
(1969). 
11 Cf. Alicia-Hernandez v. Archdiocese of Chicago, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6877 
(involving similar facts). 
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the application of the exception prior to permitting discovery on other 
issues in the suit? Third, if the court denies a church’s motion based on 
the exception, can the church take an immediate appeal, or must it 
defer any appeal until entry of final judgment? Fourth, if disputed 
questions of fact concerning the plaintiff’s status as a minister cannot 
be resolved at the summary judgment stage—for example, if there is a 
genuine dispute about the actual responsibilities of the plaintiff’s 
position—can those questions be submitted to and resolved by a jury, 
or must they be resolved by the judge? Fifth, if the defendant fails to 
raise the defense, either in the answer or later in the proceeding, may 
or should the court raise the ministerial exception sua sponte, or 
should the court instead treat the defense as waived?    
 These questions must be resolved in light of the underlying 
justification for the ministerial exception. We begin in Part II by 
considering the exception’s origins in the lower federal courts. We then 
discuss the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor and seek to identify the 
ultimate constitutional basis for the ministerial exception. We then 
turn in Part III to the procedural questions raised by suits implicating 
the exception. 
 
II.  THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
 
A. Judicial Origins of the Ministerial Exception  
 
 By the time the Court decided Hosanna-Tabor, every federal 
circuit and many state supreme courts had recognized the ministerial 
exception. In the first decision to apply the exception, McClure v. 
Salvation Army, 12 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit considered a gender discrimination claim by a female employee 
of the Salvation Army who had been terminated. Although Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act protected the defendant against claims of religious 
discrimination, by its terms it did not offer immunity from claims of 
discrimination based on membership in other protected classes. The 
Salvation Army argued, however, that Billie McClure was not an 
ordinary employee of the organization; instead, she was an ordained 
minister of that faith group. The Salvation Army argued that the court 
should read the term “employee” in Title VII to exclude ministerial 
employees. The court agreed, construing the statute in light of 
                                                 
12 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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constitutional concerns that would arise from extending the statute to 
these circumstances.13  The court reasoned: 
“The relationship between an organized church and its 
ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief 
instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its 
purpose. Matters touching this relationship must 
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical 
concern. Just as the initial function of selecting a minister 
is a matter of church administration and government, so 
are the functions which accompany such a selection. It is 
unavoidably true that these include the determination of 
a minister’s salary, his place of assignment, and the duty 
he is to perform in the furtherance of the religious mission 
of the church.”14 
The Court’s holding was based on the “nonspecific wording”15 of the 
statute, but in identifying the relevant constitutional concerns, the 
Court cited both Religion Clauses.16 The bulk of its analysis, however, 
focused on a series of cases that we discuss below and that, we 
contend, sound primarily in Establishment Clause themes.17 
 Although the Fifth Circuit addressed several issues related to 
the exception in the decade after McClure, no other federal circuit 
expressly adopted the ministerial exception during that time period. 
This is undoubtedly due at least in part to the fact that very few 
Protestant denominations permitted the ordination of women before 
the mid-1970s, and it took some number of years for women to 
complete seminary before entering the workplace as ministers. Once 
                                                 
13 Id. at 560-61. 
14 Id. at 558-59. 
15 Id. at 560. 
16 Id. at 558 (describing question presented as, “Does the application of the provisions 
of Title VII to the relationship between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure (a 
church and its minister) violate either of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment?”); id. (noting the “‘wall of separation’ between church and State” and 
citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), an Establishment Clause 
case); id. (noting that “Restrictions on the free exercise of religion are allowed only 
when it is necessary ‘to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the 
state may lawfully protect’ (quoting West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)) and citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a 
Free Exercise Clause case). 
17  Id. at 559-60 (discussing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, (1969)).  See infra at notes 58-93 and 
accompanying text. 
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this development took hold, the courts were confronted with more 
claims of employment discrimination by religious employers.18  
 In 1986, the Fourth Circuit recognized the ministerial exception 
in Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists. 19  As in 
McClure, the court relied on both Religion Clauses in concluding that 
the exception limits liability under Title VII.20 In addition, the case 
involved a complicating factor not present in McClure: the plaintiff was 
not an ordained minister. Instead, she was a “associate in pastoral 
care” at a church. 21  The court held, however, that the ministerial 
exception “does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of 
the position.”22 Because the plaintiff’s position was “important to the 
spiritual and pastoral mission of the church,” the court concluded that 
Rayburn performed the functions of a ministerial employee for 
purposes of the exception. 23  The court emphasized the limited 
character of judicial inquiry in this context: “While it is our duty to 
determine whether the position of associate in pastoral care is 
important to the spiritual mission of the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church, we may not then inquire whether the reason for Rayburn's 
rejection had some explicit grounding in theological belief.”24   
 Rayburn applied the ministerial exception to an employee who 
had not been ordained, but whose functions were substantially similar 
to those performed by ordained ministers. Subsequent decisions 
expanded even further the category of employees subject to the 
exception. For example, in EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Raleigh, North Carolina, 25  the court held that a director of music 
ministry at Sacred Hearth Cathedral was a ministerial employee. The 
                                                 
18 Several commentators criticized the ministerial exception, in large part because of 
its effect on women’s rights in the workplace. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above 
the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Anti-
Discrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield 
Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to 
Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275 (1994). 
19 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1986). 
20 Id. at 1168 (“Any attempt by government to restrict a church's free choice of its 
leaders thus constitutes a burden on the church’s free exercise rights.”); id. at 1169-
70 (“To subject church employment decisions of the nature we consider today to Title 
VII scrutiny would also give rise to “excessive government entanglement” with 
religious institutions prohibited by the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)). 
21 Id. at 1168-69. 
22 Id. at 1168. 
23 Id. at 1169. 
24 Id. at 1169. 
25 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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plaintiff’s “primary duties at the Cathedral and its school consisted of 
the selection, presentation, and teaching of music, which is integral to 
the spiritual and pastoral mission of the Catholic Church and many 
other religious traditions ….” 26   Similarly, in Alicia-Hernandez v. 
Archdiocese of Chicago,27 the court applied the exception to a claim by 
the Archdiocese’s communications manager. The court reasoned that 
the plaintiff was responsible “for promoting the church and spreading 
its message within the Hispanic community” and for acting “as a 
liaison between the church and [those] it [seeks] to reach.”28   
 At the same time, courts expanded the ministerial exception to 
reach all class-based protections under Title VII (except those related 
to sexual harassment)29 and other federal employment discrimination 
statutes.30 Courts have also applied the exception to bar certain state-
law claims, including defamation claims arising out of a minister’s 
employment by a church31 and breach of contract claims by terminated 
ministers. 32  The courts in these cases reasoned that the exception 
applies to all claims by ministerial employees that would require the 
court to resolve specifically religious questions about the employee’s 
performance in or fitness for the position.33 
 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith,34 which strictly limited 
                                                 
26 Id. at 797. 
27 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6877. 
28 Id. at *13 (quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 121 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1340 (D.Col. 
2000), aff’d 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002)).  
29 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes 
Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 160-
63 (2009) (arguing that courts can adjudicate sexual harassment claims by ministers 
if “the injury attributable to sexual harassment can be separated from the 
defendants’ evaluation of her performance and termination of her position”); infra at 
notes 99-102 and accompanying text. 
30  Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying 
ministerial exception to claim by church music director under Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying 
exception to claim by ordained minister under Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act).  
31 Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying 
ministerial exception to bar defamation seeking damages for injury to reputation 
arising from discharge from a ministerial position). 
32 Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, D.C. App. Lexis 656 (2002) (applying ministerial 
exception to breach of contract and defamation claims by ordained minister who was 
terminated by the congregation).  
33 See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 29, at 152-54 
(breach of contract cases); 160-63 (sexual harassment cases). 
34 485 U.S. 660 (1990). 
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claims of religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, some 
commentators questioned whether the ministerial exception should 
survive.35 The D.C. Circuit, however, squarely held that Smith had no 
impact on the availability of the exception. Indeed, in EEOC v. 
Catholic University of America, 36  the court raised the ministerial 
exception sua sponte after the defendant failed to raise it as a defense 
to gender discrimination claims arising out of a tenure denial by a 
professor of canon law.37   
 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hosanna-Tabor, 
there was no circuit split about the existence of the ministerial 
exception. 38  There was, however, a split among the federal circuit 
courts, and among state courts, about the correct procedures for 
resolving cases involving the exception. Specifically, the lower courts 
had divided over how to raise and resolve a defense based on the 
exception. Some courts had concluded that the exception operated as a 
jurisdictional bar.39 On this view, the conclusion that the ministerial 
exception applied required dismissal of the suit for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Courts that followed this approach reasoned that 
because courts lack competence to decide ecclesiastical questions, they 
must lack power to decide cases implicating the ministerial 
exception. 40 In those courts, the proper means of raising a defense 
based on the exception, like any other defense of lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, was generally by motion to dismiss.41 
 Other courts had held that the ministerial exception did not 
operate as a jurisdictional bar, because federal district courts clearly 
have “authority to review claims arising under federal law.”42 These 
courts treated the exception as an affirmative defense to liability 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Brant, supra note 18, at 309-10. 
36 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
37 Id. at 459-60. 
38 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
39 See Young v. N. Ill. Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 188 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of suit by a 
ministerial employee against a church). For the theoretical underpinnings of this 
view, see Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: 
Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of 
the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008) (arguing that the exception 
operates as a jurisdictional bar to preserve church autonomy). 
40 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1038–1039 (7th Cir. 2006). 
41 See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]his 
Circuit has treated the “ministerial exception” as jurisdictional in nature and an 
appropriate ground for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).”); Tomic, 442 
F.3d at 1038. 
42 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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rather than as a bar to jurisdiction. 43 But even these courts were 
divided over the correct procedure for raising and resolving the 
defense. Some courts held that religious organizations could raise the 
exception in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).44 Because the question whether the exception applied in a 
given case often turned on disputed factual issues, courts that treated 
the exception as an affirmative defense often permitted discovery 
before resolving the defendant’s motion. But those courts disagreed 
further over the appropriate scope of discovery in such cases. Some     
invited the parties to engage in limited discovery focused exclusively 
on the application of the ministerial exception.45 In those courts, the 
parties typically followed this limited discovery by submitting 
affidavits about the employee’s responsibilities. The court would then 
entertain a motion for summary judgment by the defendant based on 
the exception. 46  Other courts treated the defense like any other 
affirmative defense and declined to limit discovery at the threshold to 
the question whether the employee was properly considered a 
minister.47 In these courts, general discovery, including discovery on 
the application of the exception, would proceed, and the exception 
would be simply one of many possible grounds for an eventual motion 
for summary judgment.48  
 
B. The Court’s Decision in Hosanna-Tabor  
 
                                                 
43 Bollard v. California Province of Soc. of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999). 
44 See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302 (“[W]e conclude that the exception does not act as a 
jurisdictional bar, but rather, is best viewed as a challenge to the sufficiency of [the 
plaintiff’s] claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”); accord Bryce v. Bryce v. Episcopal Church in 
the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002); Bollard v. Cal. Province of 
the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999); Natal v. Christian & Missionary 
Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989). 
45  See, e.g., Schmoll v. Chapman University, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1437-39, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 426, 428-29 (1999). 
46  Id. at 428 (“In light of this uncontroverted evidence, the court granted summary 
judgment to Chapman, finding the university constitutionally protected against state 
interference with its employment decision affecting Schmoll.”). 
47  See, e.g., Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against 
Discrimination, 463 Mass. 472, 975 N.E.2d 433 (2012) (reversing pre-Hosanna-Tabor 
trial court decision that enjoined state equal employment commission investigation of 
age discrimination claim by religious school teacher). 
48 975 N.E.2d at 441 (rejecting view that “the First Amendment requires all discovery 
to be stayed until the affirmative defense of ministerial exception is fully 
adjudicated”).  
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 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court considered both the substance and 
the procedure of the ministerial exception. We consider them in turn. 
 
 1.  Finding a Ministerial Exception 
 
 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court for the first time embraced the 
ministerial exception. The Court noted that the lower courts had 
“uniformly recognized the existence” of the exception to preclude 
adjudication of most discrimination claims arising out of “the 
employment relationship between a religious institution and its 
ministers.”49 The Court agreed that with those courts that its prior 
decisions “confirm that it is impermissible for the government to 
contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”50    
 After an extensive review of the historical and doctrinal basis for 
the exception, the Court turned to whether the plaintiff was properly 
considered a minister. Even though she was a teacher of 
predominantly secular subjects, and had only limited religious duties, 
the Court concluded that she counted as a minister for purposes of the 
exception. 51  Although the Court expressly declined to announce a 
specific test for defining ministers,52 the Court’s conclusion that the 
plaintiff was a minister suggests that it applied a rather capacious 
definition of the role.53 In addition, eight members of the Court agreed 
that defining ministers for purposes of the exception is a task properly 
                                                 
49 565 U.S. at 188. 
50 Id. at 185. 
51 Id. at 190-95. 
52 Id. at 190 (“We are reluctant [to] adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an 
employee qualifies as a minister.  It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case 
involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the 
circumstances of her employment.”).   
53 The Court described Cheryl Perich’s responsibilities as follows:   
“Respondent Cheryl Perich was first employed by Hosanna–Tabor as a lay 
teacher in 1999. After Perich completed her colloquy later that school year, 
Hosanna–Tabor asked her to become a called teacher. Perich accepted the 
call and received a “diploma of vocation” designating her a commissioned 
minister. Perich taught kindergarten during her first four years at Hosanna–
Tabor and fourth grade during the 2003–2004 school year. She taught math, 
language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music. She also taught a 
religion class four days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional 
exercises each day, and attended a weekly school-wide chapel service. Perich 
led the chapel service herself about twice a year.” 
Id. at 178. The Court relied on several features of Perich’s position in concluding that 
she was a minister: “the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance 
reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions 
she performed for the Church.” Id. at 192. 
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performed by courts reviewing claims within the reach of the 
exception.54 Those eight Justices implicitly rejected Justice Thomas’s 
suggestion that the mere invocation of the exception by a religious 
organization precludes further judicial inquiry.55   
 The Court based its recognition of the ministerial exception on 
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The Court 
explained: “By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the 
Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape 
its own faith and mission through its appointments. Granting the state 
the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful 
also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government 
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”56 Accordingly, the Court 
repeatedly stated that the ministerial exception is “grounded in the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”57 
 A close reading of the case reveals, however, that Establishment 
Clause concerns predominate. 58  Although the Court certainly 
                                                 
54 565 U.S. at 190-95 (opinion for a unanimous Court) (considering the employee’s 
responsibilities and determining whether she was properly considered a minister for 
purposes of the exception); id. at 204-05 (Alito, J., concurring, joined by Kagan, J.) 
(concluding that the employee was a minister for purposes of the exception because 
she “played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious message and 
as a leader of its worship activities”). The Court concluded, however, that courts 
should not consider whether the religious institution’s justification for the adverse 
employment action was sincerely religious or instead pretextual. For an explanation 
of this conclusion, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 1265, 1279-80 (2017). 
55 Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the Religion Clauses require 
civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious 
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”). Justice 
Thomas reasoned that “the Religion Clauses guarantee religious organizations 
autonomy in matters of internal governance, including the selection of those who will 
minister the faith. A religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would be 
hollow, however, if secular courts could second-guess the organization's sincere 
determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’ under the organization’s 
theological tenets.” Id. at 196-97.  
56 Id. at 188-89. 
57  Id. at 189; see id. at 181 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from 
interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”); id. at 
189 (“We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing 
to say about a religious organization's freedom to select its own ministers.”); id. at 
194 (“The EEOC and Perich originally sought an order reinstating Perich to her 
former position as a called teacher. By requiring the Church to accept a minister it 
did not want, such an order would have plainly violated the Church’s freedom under 
the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers.”). 
58 See Lupu & Tuttle, Unanimity, supra note 54, at 1280-1287. 
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identified religious liberty as one reason for finding a ministerial 
exception, the case law on which the decision rests, as well as the 
Court’s reasoning, makes clear its focus on the problem of 
governmental resolution of quintessentially religious questions. The 
line of cases on which the Court relied stretches back to Watson v. 
Jones,59 a federal common-law decision in which the Court required 
judicial deference to decisions made by the highest body within the 
Presbyterian Church. The dispute concerned the ownership of property 
of the Presbyterian Church in Kentucky. The Court, invoking a “broad 
and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system 
of laws,” deferred to the decision of the General Assembly of the 
Presbyterian Church awarding ownership to one of the competing 
factions.60 
 In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox 
Church in North America,61 the Court adopted Watson’s reasoning as a 
matter of constitutional doctrine under the First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses.62  Kedroff involved a dispute between a local Russian 
Orthodox congregation in New York and the church hierarchy in 
Moscow over control of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral in New York 
and the appointment of church leaders in the United States.63 The 
state legislature had enacted a law that required every Russian 
Orthodox church in New York to recognize the determination of the 
governing body of the North American churches as authoritative.64 The 
New York Court of Appeals relied on the law in ruling against the 
                                                 
59 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871). 
60 Id. at 727. 
61 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
62 Id. at 115-16 (noting that the Court decided Watson “before judicial recognition of 
the coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of the 
First Amendment against state action,” but that “[f]reedom to select the clergy, 
where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have 
federal constitutional protection …”). 
63 Id. at 95-97. 
64 Id. at 97-99.  The law at issue was Article 5-C of the Religious Corporations Law of 
New York. “The purpose of the article was to bring all the New York churches, 
formerly subject to the administrative jurisdiction of the Most Sacred Governing 
Synod in Moscow or the Patriarch of Moscow, into an administratively autonomous 
metropolitan district. That district was North American in area, created pursuant to 
resolutions adopted at a sobor held at Detroit in 1924. This declared autonomy was 
made effective by a further legislative requirement that all the churches formerly 
administratively subject to the Moscow synod and patriarchate should for the future 
be governed by the ecclesiastical body and hierarchy of the American metropolitan 
district.” Id. at 98. 
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Russian Orthodox hierarchy in Moscow, 65  but the Supreme Court 
reversed. The Court held that civil government must not usurp church 
authority to decide “strictly ecclesiastical” matters.66 Because of the 
structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Court ruled, such 
decisions belong to the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. 67 The Court thus invalidated the state law that 
purported to resolve the intra-church dispute.68   
 The Court reaffirmed this approach, albeit in a quite different 
denominational context, in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church.69 Blue Hull 
involved the effort of a majority of a congregation to split from the 
denominational body, because of the denominational body’s liberal 
stances on school prayer, the role of women in the church, and the 
Vietnam War. 70 At root, the conflict was over ownership of church 
property.71 The Georgia trial court held that the denomination had 
departed from traditional Presbyterian doctrine, and therefore that the 
congregation had the right to claim the property upon its departure 
from the denomination.72 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed,73 
but U.S. Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that courts are not 
competent to decide what constitutes fidelity to the doctrines of a 
particular faith.74 The Court explained that “First Amendment values 
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn 
on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine 
and practice.” 75 Accordingly, “the First Amendment enjoins the 
employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes” 
                                                 
65  See St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America v. 
Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 33, 96 N.E.2d 56, 74 (1950). 
66 Id. at 119. 
67 Id. at 115. 
68 Id. at 119. 
69 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
70 Id. at 442 & n.1. 
71 Id. at 441-43. 
72 Id. at 443-44 (“[T]he jury was instructed to determine whether the actions of the 
general church ‘amount to a fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original 
tenets and doctrines of the (general church), so that the new tenets and doctrines are 
utterly variant from the purposes for which the (general church) was founded.’”). 
73  Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian 
Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968). 
74 Id. at 445-56 (stating that it is “wholly inconsistent with the American concept of 
the relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine 
ecclesiastical questions”). 
75 Id. at 449. 
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and “commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without 
resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.”76   
 The Court returned to this principle in Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese of North America v. Milivojevich,77 which involved 
the efforts of U.S.-based bishop Milivojevich to resist the authority of 
the Belgrade-based church hierarchy. The hierarchy had restricted the 
size of Milivojevich’s jurisdiction. When he vehemently resisted, the 
hierarchy removed him from his position.78  Milivojevich filed suit in 
Illinois state court, claiming (among other things) that the church had 
failed to follow its internal procedures for removal of a bishop. The 
Illinois Supreme Court agreed with Milivojevich and ordered him 
restored to his diocese and the diocese restored to its original size.79 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts lack authority 
to resolve “quintessentially religious controversies.”80 The Court stated 
that when “hierarchical religious organizations” adjudicate disputes 
over internal discipline and church governance, “the Constitution 
requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon 
them.”81  
 Jones v. Wolf also involved a dispute between competing factions 
over church property. 82  The Court clarified that state and federal 
courts are not always bound to defer to the hierarchy of a particular 
denomination in resolving a dispute within a religious body. Instead, 
the Court said that “a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt 
neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property 
dispute.” 83  By neutral principles, the Court meant “objective, well-
established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and 
judges.”84 But the Court also imposed an important limit on the use of 
“neutral principles” to resolve intra-church disputes: “If in such a case 
the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the 
civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
78 Id. at 702-06. 
79 Id. at 708; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and 
Canada v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill.2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975). 
80 426 U.S. at 720. 
81 Id. at 725. 
82 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
83 Id. at 604. 
84 Id. at 603. 
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to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative 
ecclesiastical body.”85 
 Although these cases cited the First Amendment in general, 
rather than relying separately on the Establishment Clause or the 
Free Exercise Clause,86 the Court’s core argument in each case must be 
based on the Establishment Clause. First, in none of these cases did 
the Court suggest that a balancing of interests would be appropriate in 
resolving the disputes.87 In the middle of the twentieth century, when 
the Court decided Blue Hull and Milivojevich, such balancing was a 
hallmark of decision under the Free Exercise Clause. 88  In Free 
Exercise cases in that era, the Court measured the interference with 
religious liberty against the state’s interest in regulating the matter in 
question.89 But the Court made clear in Blue Hull and Milivojevich 
that the prohibition on adjudication of religious questions is categorical 
and not contingent on the relative strength of the government’s reason 
for intervention. 90  In Establishment Clause cases, by contrast, the 
Court never considers whether an alleged violation of the Clause is 
outweighed by some governmental interest advanced by the challenged 
                                                 
85 Id. at 604; accord at 602 (“As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment 
requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or 
polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.”). 
86 See, e.g., Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 100 n.5; Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 450; Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. at 698, 709-10. 
87 See Lupu & Tuttle, Unanimity, supra note 54, at 1276. 
88 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“The freedom to act 
[under the Free Exercise Clause] must have appropriate definition to preserve the 
enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so 
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected 
freedom.”); id. at 308 (noting that the “state of Connecticut has an obvious interest in 
the preservation and protection of peace and good order within her borders” and 
inquiring “whether the alleged protection of the State’s interest, means to which end 
would, in the absence of limitation by the federal Constitution, lie wholly within the 
State’s discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has come 
into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected by the federal compact”); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (determining “whether some compelling 
state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute 
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right” under 
the Free Exercise Clause). 
89 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
90 See Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449 (“[T]he First Amendment enjoins the employment of 
organs of government for essentially religious purposes.”); Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 
713 (“[T]his is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of 
such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are 
not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the 
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.”). 
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action. Instead, the Court simply asks whether the challenged action is 
one subject to categorical prohibition. 
 For example, the Court’s cases addressing prayer or religious 
exercises in public schools do not consider the state’s interest in 
fostering such piety. 91  The mere fact of state-sponsored religious 
indoctrination renders such conduct impermissible. Similarly, state 
funding of worship or religious indoctrination—such as the purchase of 
Bibles for distribution to Christian congregations—would violate the 
Establishment Clause regardless of the state’s purported interest in 
promoting morality in the citizenry through Bible study.92 The same is 
true when the government displays quintessentially religious symbols 
with the purpose of endorsing religion.93 
 Second, all of the cases cited above focused narrowly on the 
religious character of the questions presented to the lower courts. In 
each of the decisions from Watson through Jones, the Supreme Court 
held that governmental bodies, including courts, lack the competence 
to resolve strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions. Although the 
indirect consequence of this approach is a zone of freedom for churches 
in their decision-making, the Court’s primary focus was on the secular 
character of civil government and its lack of authority and capacity to 
resolve quintessentially religious disputes. The assertion of such 
jurisdiction had been a hallmark of many colonial courts in the pre-
Revolutionary era, and particularly in states with established 
churches.94 But this relationship between religious organizations and 
the state has been soundly rejected by courts and other institutions of 
civil government since the founding era.   
 The Court in Hosanna-Tabor relied squarely on the line of cases 
starting with Watson in concluding that the ministerial exception 
                                                 
91 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (agreeing with the petitioners’ 
argument that “the State’s use of the Regents’ prayer in its public school system 
breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State” because 
“the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion 
must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to 
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a 
religious program carried on by government”). 
92 Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that laws that provided 
direct public funds for religious education violated the Establishment Clause). 
93 McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 
(2005) (“When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of 
advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official 
religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible 
object is to take sides.”).  
94 James H. Hutson, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 
(2007).  
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exists.95 Those cases stand for the proposition that certain questions 
are simply beyond the authority of secular civil government to decide. 
The ministerial exception should be understood and applied in light of 
that proposition. In other words, the exception does not recognize a 
broad autonomy for religious institutions; instead, it reflects only a 
specific limitation on the power of government to resolve certain 
ecclesiastical matters. In this sense, the limitation is primarily 
imposed by the Establishment Clause, even if it also promotes 
interests within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 
 Some commentators have invoked Jones v. Wolf to suggest that 
the Establishment Clause principle does not impose a categorical limit 
on adjudication of religious questions, and specifically of employment 
discrimination claims by ministers.96 We think this is mistaken. First, 
the Court in Hosanna-Tabor squarely rejected this view, and in any 
event did not even cite Jones. Second, the Court’s focus in Jones on 
neutral principles confirms that the government lacks competence to 
resolve certain types of religious questions. As the Court stated in 
Jones, “the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving 
church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and 
practice.”97 Indeed, courts may decline to defer to church hierarchies 
when neutral principles are available only because such principles 
enable courts to resolve controversies without reference to church 
doctrine.  
 Third, the Court in Jones was primarily concerned about 
property disputes, which often involve documents (such as deeds) and 
state-law presumptions that judges can interpret and apply without 
reference to religious doctrine. Disputes arising out of the employment 
context, on the other hand, often require much more nuanced judicial 
assessment of the employee’s conduct, which must be measured 
against the employer’s standard of proper performance. That standard, 
when applied to a ministerial employee, virtually always involves some 
                                                 
95  The Court in Hosanna-Tabor cited and discussed Watson, Kedroff, and 
Milivojevich.  See 565 U.S. at 185-87. 
96  Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 1001 (2013) 
(disagreeing with those who argue that judicial inquiry into pretext by a religious 
employer would require resolution of “a theological dispute”; arguing that such a 
view “ignores not only the courts’ regular examination of religious motivation but 
also their authorized use of ‘neutral principles of law’ to resolve church property 
disputes” (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), for the proposition that “a court 
may review church deeds, charters, constitutional provisions, and other documents 
as long as it interprets them in purely secular terms”)). 
97  Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (citing Serbian Orthodox Diocese of North Am. v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)). 
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question of religious fitness for the position. As a consequence, there 
generally will not be any neutral—which is to say, secular— principles 
that courts can apply to resolve such questions. (This probably 
explains why the Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not bother to discuss 
Jones.)  
 The lower courts’ approach to the ministerial exception—both 
before and after Hosanna-Tabor—confirms that the exception derives 
principally from the Establishment Clause, rather than from notions of 
church autonomy implicit in most Free-Exercise-Clause-based claims. 
First, the courts that recognized the exception before the decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor uniformly relied on the line of cases holding that 
courts lack competence to adjudicate purely religious questions. 98 
Second, the lower courts have concluded that the ministerial exception 
does not defeat certain types of claims by ministers against their 
religious employers. Courts can grant relief on those claims because 
their resolution does not require determination of any ecclesiastical 
questions. 
For example, the lower courts that have addressed the issue 
have uniformly concluded that the ministerial exception does not bar 
sexual harassment claims under Title VII. 99  Those courts have 
reasoned that such claims do not require any inquiry into the 
minister’s fitness for the position, but instead turn on the workplace 
conduct of the minister’s co-workers. 100  Similarly, the lower courts 
have concluded that the ministerial exception does not bar certain 
breach of contract claims. 101 When ministers sue after termination 
seeking to recover unpaid wages, courts typically resolve the claims 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 559-60 (citing Watson, Kedroff, and Blue Hull); 
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-68 (citing Kedroff and Milivojevich). 
99 See e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715; 1991 Minn. App. Lexis 635; McKelvey v. 
Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 840 (2002); Morgan v. Central Baptist Church of Oak 
Ridge, 2013 WL 12043468 (E.D. Tenn.). 
100  See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]hat is left open … is a restricted, secular inquiry: whether Elvig can carry her 
burden of proving she was sexually harassed and, if she can, whether the Church can 
prove its affirmative defense. ‘Nothing in the character of [the inquiry] will require ... 
evaluat[ion of] religious doctrine or the ‘reasonableness' of the religious practices 
followed [by the church].’ The reasonableness component of the … affirmative defense 
evaluates an employer's actions in responding to sexual harassment rather than the 
motivations for that response.” (quoting Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950)); see also Lupu & 
Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 29, at 160-63. 
101 See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 
1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Petruska, 462 F.3d at 310-12. 
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and, when appropriate, award relief.102 Such claims do not require any 
judicial determination of a minister’s fitness for office, and accordingly 
are not barred by the exception.   
 If the ministerial exception derived principally from concerns 
about church autonomy, sexual harassment and breach of contract 
claims would likely be barred. After all, resolution of such claims 
requires judicial inquiry into the relationship between a religious 
organization and its employees. The cases concluding that the 
ministerial exception does not always defeat such claims flow naturally 
from the view that the exception effectuates the Establishment Clause 
principle that civil government lacks competence to resolve 
ecclesiastical questions. 
 
 2.  Characterizing the Ministerial Exception 
 
 Whereas the Court in Hosanna-Tabor dedicated significant 
attention to the arguments in favor of recognition of a ministerial 
exception, it addressed the procedural issues implicated by the 
exception briefly and only in a footnote. Acknowledging the divide 
among the lower courts, the Supreme Court announced that the 
exception does not function as a jurisdictional bar. Instead, the Court 
concluded that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense. The 
Court explained that “the issue presented by the exception is ‘whether 
the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether 
the court has ‘power to hear [the] case.’” 103  The Court added that 
federal district courts “have power to consider ADA claims in cases of 
this sort, and to decide whether the claim can proceed or is instead 
barred by the ministerial exception.”104 Although the footnote is quite 
significant, it is remarkably terse, given the potentially significant 
consequences of the conclusion that the exception operates as an 
affirmative defense.  
                                                 
102 See Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359 (“[A]ppellant argues that the first amendment 
cannot bar his action for breach of an oral employment contract. We find this 
contention compelling…. A church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily 
through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”) (citing 
Jones v. Wolf, 419 U.S. 595, 606 (1979)); see also Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and 
Congregations, supra note 29, at 152-54. 
103 Id. at 194 n.4 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 
254 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
104 565 U.S. at 194 n.4. 
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 Some commentators have read the Hosanna-Tabor footnote 
implicitly to reinforce a broad doctrine of church autonomy,105 which 
they find embodied elsewhere in the opinion. For example, Michael 
Helfand has argued that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-
Tabor lays the groundwork for reconceptualizing church autonomy as a 
constitutionalized version of arbitration.”106 As we discuss in greater 
detail below, defendants ordinarily waive affirmative defenses by 
failing (or choosing not) to raise them. 107  Helfand relies on this 
characteristic of affirmative defenses to argue that they confirm and 
enhance the autonomy of religious institutions. On this view, the 
religious organization’s choice to waive the ministerial exception (by 
declining to raise it) amounts to consent to a secular court’s binding 
resolution of a dispute with a ministerial employee.108  
 Helfand understands the church property cases that we 
described above to mean that the members and employees of religious 
organizations impliedly consent to church adjudication of their 
disputes.109 Helfand does not read those cases to stand for a principle 
of limited competence of secular courts to decide such disputes. 110 
Instead, in his view, they reflect a judgment that disputes between 
religious organizations and their members or employees will be 
resolved by secular courts only if the religious organization elects that 
forum for adjudication.111 He uses Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four to 
ground this understanding of church autonomy: 
“[O]nce we unmoor church autonomy from judicial incompetence 
and instead hitch church autonomy to the consent of the parties, 
Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four comes into focus. If religious 
institutional authority is grounded in an implied agreement 
between the institution and its  members, then surely those 
                                                 
105 For an example of an article that advances a broad view of church autonomy, see 
Christopher Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-
Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2013). 
106 Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1891, 1901 (2013). 
107 See infra at notes 190-194 and accompanying text. 
108 Helfand, supra note 106, at 1921-23. 
109 Id. at 1921. 
110 Id. at 1902 (“[T]he deference and authority granted arbitrators has nothing to do 
with the incompetence of courts or an attempt to emphasize the limited nature of 
state power; arbitrators have authority because parties jointly choose to place their 
disputes within the jurisdiction of an alternative forum for resolution.”). 
111 Id. at 1923-24. 
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very same parties can employ that same consent mechanism to 
authorize courts to resolve intractable religious disputes.”112   
In Helfand’s view, the choice whether to raise the ministerial exception 
both reflects and reinforces the religious institution’s autonomy. 
 As explained above, we disagree with the suggestion that the 
ministerial exception is primarily rooted in a doctrine of church 
autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause.113 In part, this is because 
we thoroughly disagree with his interpretation of the church property 
and personnel cases that the Court relied on in Hosanna-Tabor. In 
none of those decisions did the Court suggest that religious 
communities could confer authority or competence on secular courts to 
decide purely ecclesiastical questions. Indeed, as we explained above, 
those cases stand for precisely the opposite proposition. Secular courts 
lack authority to decide religious questions regardless of whether the 
parties to the disputes raising those questions want courts to resolve 
them.114 
 In addition, we think that Helfand’s argument ultimately leads 
to constitutional difficulties in the procedures for adjudicating cases 
involving the ministerial exception. On Helfand’s view, a religious 
institution can waive the exception and voluntarily submit a religious 
dispute to the civil courts. As we explain below, the underlying 
justification for the ministerial exception is simply inconsistent with 
this view.115  
 It is not surprising that the Hosanna-Tabor footnote has 
prompted such arguments. The Court’s analysis of the proper 
procedure for resolving assertions of the ministerial exception was not 
only brief but also circular. The Court’s justification for treating the 
exception as an affirmative defense instead of a jurisdictional bar was 
that the exception did not raise a question of the court’s “power to hear 
the case.”116 But this simply states the conclusion. After all, when we 
say that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a particular 
case, what we mean is that the court lacks power to hear it.  
 Despite its circularity, we agree with the Court’s ultimate 
conclusion that the ministerial exception operates as an affirmative 
defense rather than as a jurisdictional bar. First, as a straightforward 
matter of civil procedure, federal courts have subject matter 
                                                 
112 Id. at 1923. 
113  See supra at notes 58-102 and accompanying text; see also Lupu & Tuttle, 
Unanimity, supra note 54, at 1296-1303. 
114 See Lupu & Tuttle, Unanimity, supra note 54, at 1299-1301. 
115 See infra at notes 195-209 and accompanying text. 
116 565 U.S. at 194 n.4. 
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jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law.117 Claims asserted in 
federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, or the Americans with Disabilities 
Act are claims arising under federal law even when asserted by 
employees of religious organizations. To be sure, when the ministerial 
exception applies, such claims will ordinarily fail. But the inability of 
the plaintiff to recover does not retroactively deprive the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.  
 Second, determining the applicability of the ministerial 
exception will usually require the resolution of threshold questions of 
fact. As we explain in more detail below, to decide whether the 
exception applies, a court must first conclude that the employee in 
question is in fact properly deemed a minister. As in Hosanna-Tabor, 
this inquiry will often require the resolution of disputed questions of 
fact, such as what the employee’s actual responsibilities entail.118 The 
court also has to determine whether the plaintiff’s specific claims are of 
the sort that implicate the exception, a decision that also might turn on 
facts not apparent on the face of the complaint.119 
 Questions of subject matter jurisdiction, however, should be 
susceptible to resolution at the threshold of a case. This is true both for 
formal and prudential reasons. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power 
of a court to proceed. If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it 
should not entertain the case. In addition, it wastes judicial resources 
for courts to defer resolution of the question of their subject matter 
jurisdiction until after the parties have spent time on discovery and 
other pre-trial matters. In other words, a court should be able to decide 
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction based on the allegations in 
the complaint. To be sure, there are times when a court has to resolve 
disputed questions of fact in order to decide whether it has subject 
                                                 
117 The Court in Hosanna-Tabor appears to have been concerned with suits filed in 
federal court rather than in state court. After all, the Supreme Court does not 
determine the subject matter jurisdiction of the state courts. As such, there is 
nothing to stop a state, either by legislative action or judicial decision, from 
concluding that its courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over cases implicating the 
ministerial exception. But states lack authority to depart from Hosanna-Tabor in the 
opposite direction. Because the ministerial exception implements the Religion 
Clauses of the federal Constitution, state courts cannot decide cases in which the 
exception applies.   
118 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191-94 (discussing whether Cheryl Perich was 
properly considered a minister, in light of her responsibilities). 
119 A breach-of-contract claim by a minister against her employer seeking unpaid 
wages, for example, is not barred by the exception. See supra at notes 101-102 and 
accompanying text. 
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matter jurisdiction, such as when, in a suit not arising under federal 
law, there is a conflict over where a party is domiciled.120 But cases 
involving the ministerial exception will virtually always raise 
questions of fact.  
 For these reasons, we agree with the Court that the ministerial 
exception operates as an affirmative defense. Our agreement largely 
reflects the technical understanding of “jurisdictional” in matters of 
civil procedure. This conclusion, however, does not contradict the 
entire body of scholarly work that has characterized the relationship 
between civil government and religious institutions as 
“jurisdictional.” 121  The central premise of that work reflects the 
fundamental claim that institutions of civil government—because of 
their secular character—lack competence to decide religious questions. 
A matter can be conceptually jurisdictional, in the sense of competence, 
without it necessarily depriving the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
 Accordingly, it does not follow from Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote 
four that courts should treat the ministerial exception the same way 
that they treat other, conventional affirmative defenses. As the Court 
explained in Hosanna-Tabor, the exception applies as a matter of 
constitutional imperative, not simply as a prudential matter. Put more 
starkly, the Hosanna-Tabor footnote must be read in light of the 
fundamental justification for the ministerial exception. And that 
exception, as we have argued above, imposes a disability on civil 
government with respect to specific religious questions. Thus, the 
affirmative defense must take into account this constitutional 
disability. 
 For this reason, we agree only in part with Professor 
Wasserman’s analysis of Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote 4. 122 Wasserman 
argues that the Court properly concluded that the ministerial 
exception is an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar 
because the exception reflects Congress’s lack of “prescriptive 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., Boustead v. Barancid, 151 F.R.D. 102, 105 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (permitting 
the plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery “on the jurisdictional issue”); S. I. Strong, 
Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
489, 555-57 (2010); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 
Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exception, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 289, 314 (2012) (discussing “jurisdictional discovery”). 
121 See, e.g., IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS 
PEOPLE 3-39 (2014).  
122 Wasserman, supra note 120. 
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jurisdiction”123 over religious questions.124  When the government lacks 
this form of authority, it cannot prescribe any rule to govern the 
conduct at issue.  But “the nonexistence of a legal rule does not deprive 
a court of judicial jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim under appropriate 
law.”125 Instead, in Wasserman’s view, a “claim of right fails because 
there is no legal rule … to be enforced, which results in the failure on 
the merits of any claim brought under that purported rule.”126   
 In other words, Wasserman argues that the ministerial 
exception exists because Congress lacks power to regulate certain 
church affairs. In his view, however, courts do not lack “adjudicative 
jurisdiction”127 over such matters.128 Instead, courts must rule against 
the plaintiff in cases in which the exception applies because Congress 
lacked power to impose a duty on the church in the first place. This is 
simply another way of saying that courts do not lack subject matter 
jurisdiction to decide cases implicating the ministerial exception. On 
this view, the problem “is not that courts are barred from evaluating a 
priest’s job performance or from ordering his reinstatement; it is that 
secular lawmaking institutions are barred from enacting rules that 
provide a legal basis for evaluation and reinstatement.”129  
 As noted above, we agree with Wasserman that the ministerial 
exception does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction 
over cases implicating the exception. But we disagree with his further 
                                                 
123  Id. at 298 (“Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power of secular rulemakers to 
prescribe legal rules and to regulate real-world behavior.”). 
124 Id. at 300-301 (“The ministerial exemption limits the right/duty combinations that 
Congress can create between religious organizations and their ministerial employees, 
as well as the conduct that Congress, exercising its prescriptive jurisdiction, can 
prohibit in that relationship. In other words, it is accurate to say that the First 
Amendment erects a ‘jurisdictional bar,’ so long as we understand that the 
jurisdiction barred is Congress’s prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction to enact legal 
rules regulating some real-world conduct.”). 
125 Id. at 299. 
126 Id. at 299-300. 
127 Id. at 302 (“[A]djudicative jurisdiction … is a court’s root power to adjudicate—to 
hear and resolve legal and factual issues under substantive legal rules, and to 
provide the adjudicative and remedial forum to resolve claims of right. Adjudicative 
jurisdiction has nothing to do with the ultimate success of a claim on its merits, but 
rather focuses solely on whether the court has the power to provide a forum for 
considering and resolving the legal and factual disputes under those rules in either 
direction.”). 
128 Id. at 303 (“The ministerial exemption is indeed a constitutional bar on civil 
jurisdiction. But the bar is not on the court's civil jurisdiction to decide the case 
before it, but on Congress’s civil jurisdiction to enact legal rules regulating churches’ 
conduct toward ministerial employees.”). 
129 Id. at 304. 
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suggestion that any disability the courts face in resolving such 
questions is solely the consequence of Congress’s lack of authority to 
prescribe the governing rule.130 In our view, courts face a limitation—
what Wasserman calls an “adjudicative disability”131—for the same 
reason that Congress lacks the power to prescribe a substantive rule: 
civil government is simply not competent to adjudicate strictly and 
purely ecclesiastical questions. 132 When courts seek to resolve such 
matters, they impermissibly inject civil government into church 
affairs.133 
 To take an example drawn from a slightly different context, a 
state legislature has prescriptive authority to regulate property, and 
even to regulate church ownership of property. But courts nevertheless 
lack authority to resolve certain types of disputes that can arise over 
the ownership of that property, such as when competing claims to the 
property can be decided only by resolving a disputed question of church 
doctrine.  
Indeed, the Kedroff case, on which the Court relied in Hosanna-
Tabor, was in fact the culmination of an ongoing dispute over how to 
resolve a question about church property. In 1945, the New York 
legislature enacted a law providing “both for the incorporation and 
administration of Russian Orthodox churches.”134 The purpose of the 
law was to make all Russian Orthodox churches in New York 
autonomous from the Patriarch of Moscow.135 “This declared autonomy 
was made effective by a further legislative requirement that all the 
                                                 
130 Id. at 304 (“[T]he limitation on judicial decisionmaking [when the ministerial 
exception applies] is incidental to the broader limitation on legislative power and on 
the reach and scope of the substantive law Congress can enact….  [T]he judicial 
limitation arises not from an absence of core adjudicative power, but from an absence 
of existing legal rules to be applied and enforced, which in turn arises from an 
absence of prescriptive authority to enact those rules.”). 
131 Id. at 303-04. 
132 See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 121, at 54-61; see also Helfand, supra note 106, at 
1897-98 n.34.  
133 Wasserman concedes that “[t]he First Amendment disables all secular law and all 
secular institutions from regulating the church’s actions on matters of faith, 
structure, and membership, placing these matters entirely beyond the authority of 
the state.” Id. at 304. But he argues that the “judiciary is implicated only because 
that is the forum in which secular legal rules are enforced.” Id. In his view, “the 
problem … is not that courts are barred from evaluating a priest’s job performance or 
from ordering his reinstatement,” but rather “it is that secular lawmaking 
institutions are barred from enacting rules that provide a legal basis for evaluation 
or reinstatement.”  Id. 
134 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 97. 
135 Id. at 98. 
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churches formerly administratively subject to the Moscow synod and 
patriarchate should for the future be governed by the ecclesiastical 
body and hierarchy of the American metropolitan district.” 136  The 
Court invalidated this law in Kedroff, reasoning that a “a transfer by 
statute of control over churches” was inconsistent with both the 
“separation of church and state” and the Free Exercise Clause.137 On 
remand from the Supreme Court’s decision, the New York Court of 
Appeals ordered a retrial on an issue the New York court believed was 
left open.138 Relying on a state common-law rule, the court held that 
control of church property and authority to appoint the church 
leadership was contingent on the legitimacy of those who claim to 
exercise that power.139 In the case of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
the court determined that control by Soviet authorities in Moscow 
deprived the Patriarch of Moscow of the deference ordinarily due to 
church hierarchy.140 Instead, the court concluded that the powers at 
issue must be vested in the local members of the denomination.141   
 The United States Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam 
decision.  In Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,142 the Court explained 
that the New York decision rested “on the same premises which were 
found to have underlain the enactment of the statute struck down” in 
Kedroff.143 The Court declared that it was of no moment “that the State 
has here acted solely through its judicial branch, for whether 
legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power which we 
are asked to scrutinize.” 144  Kreshik stands for the proposition that 
neither legislatures nor courts have authority to resolve strictly and 
                                                 
136 Id. at 98-99. 
137 Id. at 110, 121. 
138 St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North America v. 
Kedroff, 306 N.Y. 38, 55, 114 N.E.2d 197, 207 (1953). 
139 114 N.E.2d at 204 (“[T]here is one basic qualification to [the application of the rule 
of Watson v. Jones]. That is that the highest church authority or tribunal, whose 
decision is to be accorded final and conclusive effect, must in truth and fact be 
capable of functioning freely with its activities directed by churchmen in the interests 
of the church and in accordance with the organic law of the church.”). 
140 Id. at 205 (“Uncritical acceptance of the principle of Watson v. Jones [would 
require] the communicants of the metropolitan district to acknowledge the 
administrative rule of persons whom they believe are mere puppets of a monolithic 
and atheistic secular power, if such communicants wish to continue to use the 
religious temporalities they have so long enjoyed.”). 
141 Id. 
142 363 U.S. 190 (1960). 
143 Id. at 190. 
144 Id. (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)). 
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purely ecclesiastical questions. As a consequence, courts face an 
adjudicative disability when confronted with these sorts of questions.  
 The ministerial exception must be understood in light of these 
principles. Although it is an affirmative defense, the underlying 
justification for the exception requires courts to treat it differently 
from ordinary affirmative defenses. In a typical case, after a defendant 
raises its affirmative defenses in the answer, the parties begin 
discovery. Normally, the parties can seek discovery of any information 
that is relevant to the claims or defenses of any party;145 discovery is 
rarely limited to material relevant solely to a particular affirmative 
defense. After the parties complete discovery, it is common for one or 
both of the parties to move for summary judgment. If the court denies 
a motion for summary judgment, the decision ordinarily is not subject 
to immediate appeal;146 instead, the matter proceeds to trial, which 
(depending on the claims) might involve a jury as fact-finder. 
 The Court’s characterization of the ministerial exception as an 
affirmative defense, however, does not require lower courts to follow 
these ordinary procedures in cases involving the exception. Instead, 
fidelity to the constitutional norms reflected in Hosanna-Tabor 
requires courts to recognize the distinctive status of this particular 
defense. As we explain below, Establishment Clause limitations on the 
authority of courts to resolve religious questions requires courts to 
treat the ministerial exception quite differently from ordinary 
affirmative defenses. 
 The Court has followed a similar approach with qualified 
immunity. 147  Government officials enjoy a qualified immunity from 
suit for their official conduct, provided that their conduct did not 
violate clearly established law.148 The Court has described the defense 
                                                 
145 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope 
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense ….”); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
26(d)(3)(B) (“Unless the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise for the parties’ 
and witnesses’ convenience and in the interests of justice … discovery by one party 
does not require any other party to delay its discovery.”).  
146 See 28 U.S.C. 1291 (“The courts of appeals … shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ….”). 
147 See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th 
Cir.2002) (comparing ministerial exception to qualified immunity). 
148 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that qualified immunity 
protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known”).  
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as “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability”149 
that courts should seek to resolve “at the earliest possible stage in 
litigation.”150 The Court nevertheless has held that qualified immunity 
is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the government 
official, rather than a jurisdictional bar.151 Because of the distinctive 
character of the defense, however, the Court has made clear that the 
ordinary rules governing the assertion and adjudication of affirmative 
defenses do not always apply to qualified immunity. For example, 
although a government official can waive the defense by failing to raise 
it, courts often allow defendants to raise the defense at stages of the 
litigation later than an ordinary affirmative defense must be 
asserted.152 In addition, denials of motions for summary judgment by 
government officials on grounds of qualified immunity are immediately 
appealable, notwithstanding the ordinary rule against interlocutory 
appeals.153   
 The Court has made clear that these special rules apply because 
of the underlying justification for the defense, which is to ensure that 
government officials are not unduly inhibited in carrying out their 
duties by fear of civil liability.154 In this respect, it closely resembles 
the ministerial exception. Both are affirmative defenses in the formal 
sense, yet they owe their existence to more fundamental legal 
principles that themselves reflect limits—prudential or 
constitutional—on the power of courts.   
 
III.  THE PROCEDURE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
 
 In our view, courts should be similarly sensitive in overseeing 
litigation that potentially involves the ministerial exception. Because 
                                                 
149 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
150 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); accord Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
151 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (“[T]his Court has never indicated that 
qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action; 
instead we have described it as a defense available to the official in question. Since 
qualified immunity is a defense, the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
152 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d 906, 913-14 (7th Cir. 
2011); Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1993); Quezada v. County 
of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 1991). 
153 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 
(1996). 
154 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (explaining that qualified 
immunity protects against “the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of 
trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of 
discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service”). 
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the Court in Hosanna-Tabor gave only cursory treatment of the 
procedural issues raised by the exception, lower courts lack guidance 
about how to proceed. In particular, the Court failed to address the 
questions most likely to arise in suits implicating the ministerial 
exception. First, should the religious organization assert the exception 
by way of a motion to dismiss, or may it only raise the defense in its 
answer and then seek to resolve the suit by way of a motion for 
summary judgment? Second, if the matter is not properly resolved at 
the motion to dismiss stage, should the court limit the scope and order 
of discovery in order to resolve the application of the exception prior to 
discovery on other issues in the suit? Third, if the court denies a 
church’s motion based on the exception, can the church take an 
immediate appeal? Fourth, if disputed questions of fact concerning the 
plaintiff’s status as a minister cannot be resolved at the summary 
judgment stage, can those questions be submitted to and resolved by a 
jury? Fifth, if the defendant fails to raise the defense, may or should 
the court raise the ministerial sua sponte, or should the court instead 
treat the defense as waived? We address these questions in turn.  
 
A.  Raising the Defense 
 
 First, does the religious organization properly assert the 
ministerial exception by way of a motion to dismiss, or may it only 
raise the defense in its answer and then seek to resolve the suit by way 
of a motion for summary judgment? If nothing else, it is clear from 
footnote 4 in Hosanna-Tabor that a court should not grant a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
based on the ministerial exception. This follows from the Court’s 
conclusion that the exception does not operate as a jurisdictional bar. A 
court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction simply because the 
case involves a claim asserted by a ministerial employee against that 
person’s religious employer. Indeed, even in cases in which the court 
concludes that the exception is a complete defense against the claim, 
the court, as a technical matter, does not lack subject matter 
jurisdiction. Instead, in such a case, the appropriate disposition is a 
judgment on the merits in favor of the religious organization.155   
                                                 
155 See Wasserman, supra note 120, at 307 (“The point is that no statutory rule exists 
as law subjecting the church-operated school for this employment decision affecting 
this employee. [A] civil action to enforce such a nonexistent rule fails, a failure on the 
merits under any of our definitions.”). 
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 Ordinarily, affirmative defenses are pleaded in the answer and 
then resolved by a motion for summary judgment after discovery.156 
That said, in some rare cases, a court may be able to grant a religious 
organization’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because of the application of the 
ministerial exception. For example, if the plaintiff sues for age 
discrimination and specifically alleges in the complaint that he is a 
minister with pastoral responsibilities in the church, a court likely can 
grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Even assuming 
that all of the plaintiff’s allegations about discrimination are true, the 
plaintiff cannot recover because of the ministerial exception. To be 
sure, as a technical matter the proper approach might be for the 
defendant to file an answer raising the exception and then to move for 
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), 157  but for present 
purposes the point is that the court may resolve such a case at the 
threshold without the need for discovery.158 
 In the ordinary run of cases, however, the ministerial exception 
will be resolved by a motion for summary judgment. The Court in 
Hosanna-Tabor made clear that the exception does not apply to all 
employees of religious organizations; instead, it applies only in cases in 
                                                 
156  See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must 
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense ….”); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a) 
(“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the 
part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”).  
157 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c) (“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not 
to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”). At least one court 
has addressed (but denied) a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the 
ministerial exception since Hosanna-Tabor. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South 
Bend, Inc., 48 F.Supp.3d 1168, 1173 (N.D. Ind. 2014).   
158 The ministerial exception is not unique in this regard. Similar questions arise in 
cases in which the allegations in the complaint make clear that the statute of 
limitations has run. Courts often grant motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in 
such cases, even though, strictly speaking, they probably ought to be resolved by 
motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). This is because the statute 
of limitations is an affirmative defense that a defendant waives by failing to raise it.  
(We address the question of waiver in the context of the ministerial exception infra at 
190-209.) As such, the defendant must assert the defense in order to rely on it as a 
basis for judgment. Accordingly, courts should grant motions resolving cases on the 
ground that they are barred by the statute of limitations only once the defendant has 
had an opportunity to assert the defense in the answer. See Von Saher v. Norton 
Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir.2010) (concluding that 
a court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by a 
statute of limitations only when “the running of the statute is apparent on the face of 
the complaint”); Young v. Spokane County, 2014 WL 2893260 (E. Dist. Wash.) 
(considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on statute of limitations).  
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which the plaintiff is properly considered a minister.159 In addition, 
although the Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not address the question 
whether all claims by ministerial employees are subject to the 
exception, many lower courts have held that the exception does not 
apply to certain claims by ministerial employees—including some 
arising under employment discrimination laws. As noted above, courts 
have regularly concluded that they may resolve claims by ministerial 
employees of sexual harassment against their religious employers, 
notwithstanding the exception. 160  Other types of claims—including 
those for breach of contract for unpaid wages—are also outside the 
scope of the ministerial exception.161   
 As a consequence, any case in which a religious organization 
raises the ministerial exception requires a court to resolve at least two 
questions: first, is the plaintiff a ministerial employee; and second, is 
the plaintiff’s claim one that is within the scope of the exception. The 
resolution of these questions almost invariably requires assessment of 
the facts at issue in the dispute. To determine whether the plaintiff is 
a ministerial employee, the court must consider at last the employee’s 
“formal title,” “the substance reflected in that title,” the employee’s 
“own use of that title,” and “the important religious functions” that the 
employee performed for the religious organization.162 The parties in 
these controversies, as in Hosanna-Tabor itself, often offer conflicting 
evidence about these matters.   
 Similarly, whether the plaintiff’s claim is the type to which the 
ministerial exception applies will sometimes require the resolution of 
disputed factual questions. For example, imagine that the plaintiff 
enters a two-year contract to perform ministerial services for a 
religious organization. After the organization fires him within that 
two-year period, he files suit for breach of contract. The religious 
organization defends by relying on a clause in the contract that 
allowed termination for “good cause.” On a motion for summary 
judgment, the court must resolve whether the good cause defense in 
this case implicates an ecclesiastical question.  If the defendant claims 
that good cause existed because the plaintiff’s sermons deviated from 
                                                 
159 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (“Having concluded that there is a ministerial 
exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, we consider 
whether the exception applies in this case.”); id. at 191-95 (determining whether the 
plaintiff, an employee of a religious organization, was properly considered a 
minister). 
160 See supra at notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra at notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
162 565 U.S. at 192. 
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church doctrine, the ministerial exception will apply; if the defendant 
claims that good cause existed for other reasons, the exception might 
not apply.   
 The Court in Hosanna- Tabor made clear, at a minimum, that 
courts must resolve the threshold question whether the plaintiff is a 
minister. The Court rejected Justice Thomas’s view, which he 
expressed in a concurring opinion, that courts must accept, without 
further inquiry, a sincere assertion of the defense by a religious 
organization.163 Accordingly, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor recognized 
that cases implicating the ministerial exception will often involve 
disputed questions of fact.164 As a consequence, a motion for summary 
judgment will ordinarily be the appropriate mechanism for resolving 
an assertion of the ministerial exception. 
 There are two ways that the defendant might present a motion 
for summary judgment based on the exception. First, a religious 
organization might file a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) and support the motion by appending additional 
materials to demonstrate the application of the exception. In such 
cases, the court should convert the motion to a motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 12(d). 165  Second, the parties might conduct 
discovery, and the defendant then files motion for summary judgment 
under Rule 56(a). After Hosanna-Tabor, because the application of the 
exception is not a jurisdictional bar, summary judgment will almost 
invariably be the appropriate mechanism for deciding whether the 
exception applies. 
                                                 
163 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the 
Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to 
a religious organization's good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”). 
164 Because the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor asserted the type of claim that plainly is 
covered by the exception, the Court had no occasion to address the application of the 
ministerial exception to other types of claims, such as breach of contract. See 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“The case before us is an employment 
discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision 
to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We 
express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions 
by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious 
employers.”). As noted above, however, resolving this question of scope will often 
require courts to decide factual disputes. 
165 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be 
given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the 
motion.”).  Some courts have taken this approach since Hosanna-Tabor. See, e.g., 
Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation, 985 F.Supp.2d 701, 711 (D.MD 2013). 
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B.  The Scope of Discovery 
 
 This conclusion raises our second question. If a case implicating 
the ministerial exception is not resolved by a motion to dismiss, should 
courts limit the scope and order of discovery to the application of the 
exception before permitting discovery on other issues in the suit? 
Ordinarily, once discovery begins, the parties presumptively are free to 
conduct discovery on anything within the scope of discovery—that is, 
any matter that is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”166 In 
cases involving the ministerial exception, however, courts should 
invoke their discretion to manage the proceedings to limit discovery to 
the matters relevant to the application of the exception.167  
 Those who defend the ministerial exception often argue for quick 
resolution of the issue in order to avoid burdening religious 
organizations with the cost of discovery. They note that the practical 
implications for a religious organization of having to litigate a 
ministerial exception claim all the way through full discovery are 
significant. Not only must churches bear the ordinary costs of 
defending the suit, but in ordinary discovery their leaders can be 
examined on questions of church doctrine and their congregations’ 
consistency with church doctrine, and countless other matters that 
might chill a religious institution’s articulation of its own faith if it 
knows that it might face discovery.168   
We do not find this justification for narrowing the scope of 
discovery, standing alone, to be particularly persuasive. To be sure, 
discovery can be costly, intrusive, and time consuming; but this is true 
for all defendants in civil litigation who seek to resolve the suit on the 
basis of some threshold defense. Instead, any argument in favor of 
                                                 
166 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b). This is confirmed by Rule 16, which states that the court 
ay issue a scheduling order to “modify the extent of discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
16(b)(3)(B)(ii). Absent such an order, the parties presumptively may seek discovery 
on any relevant issue in the suit. 
167 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). Matters relevant to the application of the 
ministerial exception include both information about whether the plaintiff is a 
ministerial employee and information about whether the claim is the type subject to 
the exception.   
168 See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question: Refining 
the Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 233, 298 n. 
330 (2012) (“[T]he Court’s decision to treat the ministerial exception as an 
affirmative defense still leaves defendants at a risk of the increased time and 
expense associated with summary judgment.”). 
 35 
limiting preliminary discovery to matters relevant to one particular 
defense must arise out of the ultimate justification for that defense.   
 Other defenders of the ministerial exception have argued that 
courts should limit discovery to the application of the exception 
because any broader discovery threatens the principle of church 
autonomy. 169  This argument relies primarily on the Free Exercise 
Clause and specifically on the claim that the Clause insulates religious 
organizations from government interference in their internal decision-
making.170 But this argument proves too much. Not every “internal” 
decision made by a religious institution is protected from scrutiny by 
courts or other organs of civil government. For example, a court may 
intervene if a congregation decides not to pay a minister after the 
minister has performed her required duties under a contract with the 
church.171 
 As we explained above, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor ultimately 
recognized a ministerial exception because of Establishment Clause 
concerns about the impropriety of civil government intruding into or 
resolving questions about the fitness of a person for employment as a 
minister.172 If courts do not impose limits on the scope of discovery in a 
suit in which the defendant religious organization has asserted the 
ministerial exception, then the plaintiff will be free to seek discovery of 
information that proves her fitness for the position. For example, a 
plaintiff unconstrained by an order narrowing the scope of discovery 
might seek to depose congregants about the quality of her sermons, or 
the orthodoxy of her teaching. But the mere discovery of such 
information could well provoke disputes or discord within the 
congregation, and the “facts” discovered are certainly ones that no 
court could properly find. In other words, the disruption of life within 
                                                 
169 See, e.g., Chopko & Parker, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 235 
(“This article advocates that the application of the ministerial exception as a 
threshold legal determination is necessary to preserve foundational religious rights 
….”); id. at 293 (“[D]iscovery should be directed towards answering questions that 
would highlight the clash of principles present in these cases, and should not 
encompass the entire merits of the claim or all of the other various issues that might 
be implicated in the case. Discovery, like other litigation expenses, compounds the 
injury that attends the invasion of this constitutionally protected turf.”). 
170 See id. at 250-69; Kalscheur, supra note 39, at 55-63; Lund, supra note 105, at 
1196-1201. 
171 See, e.g., Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, D.C. App. Lexis 656 (2002) (applying 
ministerial exception to breach of contract and defamation claims by ordained 
minister who was terminated by the congregation); Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, 
and Congregations, supra note 29, at 152-54. 
172 See supra at notes 58-102 and accompanying text. 
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the religious community would promote no legitimate governmental 
interests.   
  To be sure, if the court concludes that the ministerial exception 
does not apply—either because the plaintiff is not a minister within 
the meaning of the exception or because the claim is not one to which 
the exception applies—then it may permit discovery on other issues 
implicated by the claims in the suit. At that point, the religious 
organization cannot simply rely on a claim of autonomy or the need to 
avoid internal discord as a way of resisting discovery. But courts 
should not unnecessarily authorize discovery that might turn out to be 
moot because of the application of the ministerial exception. 
 Accordingly, if a religious organization is a defendant and raises 
the ministerial exception in a motion for summary judgment, trial 
courts should exercise their discretion to “modify the extent of 
discovery” by initially limiting discovery only to facts relevant to the 
ministerial exception. 173 This approach is typical in cases involving 
qualified immunity, 174  which (we noted above) is an atypical 
affirmative defense similar in many ways to the ministerial exception.  
                                                 
173 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii).  At least three federal district courts have taken 
this approach since Hosanna-Tabor. See Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
N.Y., 175 F.Supp.3d 152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“In a bench ruling, I found that I could 
not determine whether the ministerial exception applied at the motion to dismiss 
stage because of the necessarily fact-intensive inquiry that exception necessitates, 
and because Plaintiff had plausibly alleged that she was not a minister, and had no 
religious training, duties or functions; that others handled all religiously related 
activities; and that she was simply a secular administrator doing what a public-
school principal would do. I therefore directed the parties to engage in limited 
discovery on the issue.”); Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F.Supp.2d 668, 
670 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“The Court allowed limited discovery to determine whether the 
ministerial exception applies.”); Collette v. Archdiocese of Chicago, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 99886, at *10 (N.D.Ill.) (“To help focus the discovery to be taken in this phase, 
the Court notes that the scope of the issue subject to discovery is narrow. As there is 
no dispute that Defendants are religious institutions, the only remaining question is 
whether Collette's employment with them was ministerial.”). 
174 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599-600 (1998) (Of course, the judge should 
give priority to discovery concerning issues that bear upon the qualified immunity 
defense, such as the actions that the official actually took, since that defense should 
be resolved as early as possible.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 
(1987) (“[Q]ualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible 
stage of a litigation. [If the defendant] claims he took are different from those the 
[plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed 
lawful), then discovery may be necessary before [the defendant’s] motion for 
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved. Of course, any 
such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of [the defendant’s] 
qualified immunity.”). 
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C.  Interlocutory Appeals 
 
 Another question likely to arise in this sort of litigation is 
whether a religious organization can take an immediate appeal from a 
court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the 
ministerial exception. The ordinary rule in federal court is that denials 
of motions for summary judgment are not subject to interlocutory 
appeal; instead, parties must wait for a final judgment before filing a 
notice of appeal. 175 (The rules governing interlocutory appeals vary 
from state to state, with some jurisdictions following the federal 
approach and others authorizing immediate appeals for certain types 
of issues or trial court decisions.176)  
 There are several exceptions to the final judgment rule in 
federal court, but the Supreme Court has construed them very 
narrowly.177 The exception most likely to apply to the denial of motions 
for summary judgment in disputes over ministerial employment is the 
collateral order doctrine.178 Under that doctrine, appeal before a final 
judgment is available for “district court decisions that are conclusive, 
that resolve important questions completely separate from the merits, 
and that would render such important questions effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying 
action.”179   
 The mere fact that a trial court order resolves a matter that is 
jurisdictional in character is not sufficient to warrant immediate 
appeal under the doctrine. For example, district court decisions 
denying motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction do not fall 
within the scope of the collateral order doctrine.180 Nor does the fact 
                                                 
175 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
176 Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5701 (permitting interlocutory appeals as of right for some 
non-final orders), with N.J. Rule 2:5-6 (interlocutory appeals only on application to 
the court of appeals, and granted only in court of appeals’ discretion). 
177 See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). 
178 See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
179 Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994). 
180 Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 501 (1989) (holding that a claimed 
right to be sued in a particular forum based on a forum-selection clause is “surely as 
effectively vindicable as a claim that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant—and hence does not fall within the third prong of the collateral order 
doctrine”); Turi v. Main Street Adoption Serv., LLP, 633 F.3d 496, 502 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(“A claim that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant can be 
vindicated on appeal after trial, and thus does not satisfy the third prong of the 
collateral-order doctrine.”). 
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that an order requires the disclosure of especially sensitive information 
render it amenable to immediate appeal. The most prominent example 
of this is the Court’s conclusion that orders rejecting claims of 
attorney-client privilege are not immediately appealable collateral 
orders.181 The Court’s reasoning in concluding that such orders are not 
subject to immediate appeal almost certainly applies to orders 
rejecting claims of priest-penitent privilege, as well.182  
At first blush, denials of motions for summary judgment based 
on the ministerial exception seem like poor candidates for immediate 
appeal. First, the Court expressly concluded in Hosanna-Tabor that 
the doctrine does not serve as a jurisdictional bar, and not even 
determinations adverse to jurisdictional defenses ordinarily are 
immediately appealable. Second, the mere fact that litigation of claims 
in such suits might implicate sensitive church matters alone is not 
sufficient to qualify.183   
                                                 
181 See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (holding that 
“disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege” do not “qualify for 
immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine”).   
182 The Court acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege serves “broader public 
interests,” id. at 108, but it explained that courts “routinely require litigants to wait 
until after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our 
adversarial system,” id. at 109. The Court reasoned that “postjudgment appeals 
generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and ensure the vitality of the 
attorney-client privilege” because “appellate courts can remedy the improper 
disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other 
erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a 
new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.” 
Id. at 109. The Court also recognized that “an order to disclose privileged information 
intrudes on the confidentiality of attorney-client communications,” but it asserted 
that “deferring review until final judgment does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante 
incentives for full and frank consultations between clients and counsel.” Id. Finally, 
the Court explained that “established mechanisms for appellate review”—such as 
certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or defying a discovery order and 
appealing a contempt determination—“not only provide assurances to clients and 
counsel about the security of their confidential communications; they also go a long 
way toward addressing [the] concern that, absent collateral order appeals of adverse 
attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe hardship.”  Id. 
at 112. Even though “an order to disclose privileged material may, in some 
situations, have implications beyond the case at hand,” “the same can be said about 
many categories of pretrial discovery orders for which collateral order appeals are 
unavailable.” Id.  
183 At least one federal court of appeals has taken this approach since Hosanna-
Tabor. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 1090 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (“[A]lthough the statutory and constitutional rights asserted in defense of 
this suit are undoubtedly important, the Diocese has not established that the Title 
VII exemptions or the First Amendment more generally provides an immunity from 
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 To be sure, religious organizations have contended that denials 
of motions based on the ministerial exception should be immediately 
appealable because of the force of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Proponents of this view have argued that, in cases in which the trial 
court errs in rejecting the ministerial exception, forcing the church to 
litigate impermissibly intrudes on church autonomy, by exposing 
internal church decision-making to public scrutiny. 184   But such 
claims, like claims about the sensitivity of attorney-client 
communications, are likely insufficient for immediate appeal.  
 A stronger argument for immediate appeal of denials of motions 
for summary judgment based on the ministerial exception can be 
grounded in an analogy to the doctrine of qualified immunity. 
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for acts 
within the scope of their employment, if those acts were not 
inconsistent with clearly established law at the time of the violation. 
The Court has held that denials of motions for summary judgment 
based on qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine. 185  The Court has reasoned that qualified 
immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to 
liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Accordingly, a decision denying 
qualified immunity is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”186 
 As we explained above, although the Court concluded in 
Hosanna-Tabor that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense 
rather than a jurisdictional bar, it nevertheless made clear that the 
exception is best understood as an effectuation of the Establishment 
Clause’s limits on governmental authority to decide strictly and purely 
ecclesiastical matters. On this view, civil courts lack competence to 
resolve questions about a person’s fitness to serve as a ministerial 
                                                                                                                                     
trial, as opposed to an ordinary defense to liability.”).  As explained below, we think 
this approach is mistaken.  But see McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(permitting interlocutory appeal to prevent adjudication of nun’s standing within the 
church). 
184 See Chopko & Parker, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 295 (“[T]he 
judicial process employed to resolve this threshold legal question should focus on: (1) 
producing a narrow decision as to whether the ministerial exception applies or not, 
and (2) allowing a prompt appeal of a negative decision so as not to force the religious 
body through years of expensive litigation, simultaneously wearing down its 
resources and its will to stand on principle.”). 
185  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); supra notes 147-154 and 
accompanying text. 
186 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27. 
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employee. So understood, the exception is an affirmative defense only 
because not all assertions by churches that the plaintiff is a ministerial 
employee must be accepted by a court, and because courts can 
entertain some of types claims asserted by ministers against their 
religious employers. But the practical necessity of resolving these 
factual predicates does not change the exception’s essential character 
as an Establishment Clause limitation on the competence of 
governmental bodies to resolve certain religious questions. 
 As such, the ministerial exception closely resembles qualified 
immunity for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. If a trial court 
denies a motion for summary judgment invoking the ministerial 
exception, but the trial court turns out to have erred in that conclusion, 
the absence of an avenue for immediate appeal will require the court 
not only to permit discovery about, but to resolve, quintessentially 
religious questions. But the Establishment Clause limits the power of 
the government not only to issue and enforce a binding judgment on 
such matters, but also merely to entertain such questions.  
 Unlike qualified immunity, however, the fundamental value of 
the ministerial exception would not be entirely lost by waiting for a 
final judgment before permitting an appeal. An appellate court can 
reverse a judgment that is inconsistent with a proper understanding of 
the ministerial exception, and thus relieve the religious organization of 
improperly assigned liability. In this sense, a decision denying 
summary judgment based on the ministerial exception is not 
effectively unreviewable after a final judgment. That is, the ministerial 
exception, at bottom, is still a “defense to liability,” rather than a 
comprehensive immunity from suit. But nonetheless, application of the 
collateral order doctrine in this context would better guard against 
Establishment Clause violations by trials courts than would the 
standard requirement of a final judgment before appeal. 
 
D.  The Appropriate Finder of Disputed Facts 
 
 Although it is unusual, sometimes disputed questions of fact 
concerning the plaintiff’s status as a minister cannot be resolved at the 
summary judgment stage. For example, imagine that the plaintiff, who 
was a church organist, sues the church alleging that he was fired 
because of his age and replaced with a younger musician. 187  The 
church raises the ministerial exception and offers deposition testimony 
                                                 
187 Cf. Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen, 399 Md. 637, 925 A.2d 659 (2007) 
(holding that ministerial exception did not apply to church organist). 
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stating that the plaintiff often selected music that was used during 
worship.  The plaintiff responds with evidence that the pastor always 
selected the hymns and other liturgical music, and that the plaintiff’s 
responsibilities were limited to simply performing the music selected 
for him. In light of the other undisputed evidence about the plaintiff’s 
responsibilities, the ministerial exception would apply only if the 
plaintiff had a role in selecting hymns, and therefore in planning or 
leading worship. If there is a genuine dispute about this material fact, 
a court cannot resolve the church’s motion for summary judgment 
based on the ministerial exception. 
 This does not mean, however, that the exception cannot apply; it 
simply means that the facts necessary to determining its application 
are in dispute. Ordinarily, when a court denies a motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that the facts remain in dispute, the matter 
proceeds to trial. The same is true in cases implicating the ministerial 
exception.   
 There is little doubt that juries are competent to resolve 
disputed facts in employment discrimination cases. The question 
remains, however, whether a jury is competent to resolve the disputed 
facts necessary to establish whether the plaintiff is a ministerial 
employee. We do not believe that there is a clear or categorical answer 
to this question. Given the conventional role of juries in resolving 
disputed factual matters,188 courts should prevent juries from resolving 
factual predicates to the ministerial exception only on a showing that 
jury participation would be inconsistent with the underlying 
justification for the exception. We do not perceive any reason why this 
should be categorically true.  Instead, withdrawal of the question from 
a jury should occur only in extraordinary circumstances. For example, 
if the defendant is a house of worship of a minority faith in the 
surrounding community, it is possible that jury bias will affect the 
jury’s resolution of the disputed factual questions. 189  In addition, 
courts can use carefully constructed jury instructions or special verdict 
                                                 
188 Of course, there will be a jury trial only in those cases in which at least one of the 
parties has demanded a jury. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 38(b) (“On any issue triable of 
right by a jury, a party may demand a jury trial by … serving the other parties with 
a written demand—which may be included in a pleading—no later than 14 days after 
the last pleading directed to the issue is served ….”). In employment discrimination 
cases, however, plaintiffs often request a jury because of a widely shared perception 
that juries are more favorable to individual litigants suing institutional defendants. 
189  Cf. Chopko & Parker, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 248 
(arguing that a juror’s “preconceived notions of religion and religious issues may 
obscure the resolution of a case.”). 
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forms to alleviate any lingering concerns about jury competence to 
resolve such questions. 
 
E.  Waivability 
 
 The final procedural issue that could arise in litigation between 
a religious institution and its employee is whether the ministerial 
exception is waivable. If the defendant fails to raise the defense, either 
in the answer or later in the proceeding, may or should the court raise 
the ministerial exception sua sponte, or should the court instead treat 
the defense as waived? The ordinary rule is that a defendant waives an 
affirmative defense if it fails to raise it at a sufficiently early point in 
the litigation.190 In our adversarial system, it typically is not the role 
or province of the court to raise defenses or arguments on behalf of the 
parties.   
 There are exceptions to this general rule. For example, a party 
who fails to object to a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction at the 
threshold of the suit does not waive it. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(h)(3) specifically provides that “[i]f the court determines at any time 
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 
action.”191 But subject matter jurisdiction is unusual in this respect. 
Most defenses are waived by the failure to raise them at the earliest 
possible opportunity. Threshold defenses, such as lack of personal 
jurisdiction or improper venue, must be asserted in a pre-answer 
motion to dismiss or in the answer, with minimal opportunity for 
amendment. 192  Other affirmative defenses must be raised in the 
answer, and although courts are more generous in permitting 
                                                 
190 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively 
state any avoidance or affirmative defense ….”); Dole v. Williams Enterprises, Inc., 
876 F.2d 186, 189 (D.C.Cir.1989) (“A party’s failure to plead an affirmative defense ... 
generally results in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case.” 
(internal quotations omitted)); Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that a statutory limit on damages was “an affirmative defense 
which must be pleaded timely and that in the cases at bar the defense has been 
waived”). 
191 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3). 
192 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(h)(1) (“A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-
(5) by: (A) omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2); 
or (B) failing to either: (i) make it by motion under this rule; or (ii) include it in a 
responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of 
course.”). 
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amendment at later stages of the proceeding,193 they ordinarily will not 
raise them sua sponte.194  
 Given this set of background rules, there is a strong argument 
that courts should raise sua sponte only those defenses that are similar 
in character to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A defendant’s 
failure to raise all other defenses, on this view, should result in waiver. 
As we explained above, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor explicitly 
concluded that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, 
rather than a jurisdictional bar. Accordingly, there is a surface appeal 
to the view that a party’s failure to raise the exception should result in 
waiver, and a court should not raise it sua sponte. 
 We believe, however, that the ministerial exception should be 
deemed non-waivable, and that courts in fact have an obligation to 
raise it sua sponte when a defendant religious organization fails to do 
so. Although the exception does not formally operate as a jurisdictional 
bar, in the sense that courts do not lack subject matter jurisdiction 
over cases implicating the exception, the underlying justification for 
the exception weighs strongly in favor of non-waivability.   
 The ministerial exception is a necessary corollary of the 
Establishment Clause principle that prevents courts from resolving 
strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions. The exception applies not 
just to protect the liberty of religious organizations, but because civil 
government lacks competence to resolve religious questions. If a 
religious institution waived the ministerial exception by failing to raise 
it in a suit in which it applies, the court would be forced to resolve such 
questions, in violation of the Establishment Clause. In other words, 
government not only lacks prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate the 
qualifications for ministerial employment, but the courts also face an 
adjudicative disability to deciding them.195 
                                                 
193 See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 417-18 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that 
unpled affirmative defense was not waived when raised at trial at “pragmatically 
sufficient time”). 
194 See, e.g., Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 116 F.3d 776, 778 (5th Cir.1997) (“[A]n 
affirmative defense ... generally should not [be] raise[d] sua sponte.”); Eriline Co. S.A. 
v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (concluding that, ordinarily, a court 
should not raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte).  There are exceptions to 
this approach. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412-13 (2000) (concluding that 
the affirmative defense of res judicata may, in “special circumstances,” be raised sua 
sponte); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (holding that court may sua 
sponte raise affirmative defense of timeliness of habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(d)(1)(A)). 
195 Cf. Wasserman, supra note 120, at 303-05. 
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 At least one federal court of appeals has recognized this 
implication of Hosanna-Tabor. In Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian 
Fellowship/USA,196 a female employee was terminated for violating 
her employer’s rule against divorce. The court determined that she was 
a ministerial employee—a finding that she did not dispute—but she 
argued that the employer had waived the defense. The court 
categorically rejected the argument that a religious institution may 
waive the ministerial exception where applicable.197 The court relied 
on the Hosanna-Tabor Court’s justification for the existence of the 
exception, reasoning that the “constitutional protection is not only a 
personal one; it is a structural one that categorically prohibits federal 
and state governments from becoming involved in religious leadership 
disputes.”198   
 As a consequence, courts not only should refuse to deem the 
ministerial exception waived by a party’s failure to raise it or by 
estoppel, but also should raise it sua sponte in cases in which the facts 
disclose that it clearly applies. Consider the facts of EEOC v. Catholic 
University of America.199 The dispute involved the denial of tenure to a 
professor in the Canon Law Department at the university. The 
professor sued, asserting gender discrimination in the tenure denial.200 
The university argued that the professor’s canon law scholarship failed 
to meet the required standards of quality for tenure. For unknown 
reasons, the university did not raise the ministerial exception, even 
though litigation of her claim necessarily involved the question 
whether her scholarship reflected an orthodox understanding of church 
teaching. Indeed, the parties conducted extensive discovery, including 
                                                 
196 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015). Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, the Seventh Circuit reached 
the same conclusion.  See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 
(7th Cir.2006) (“The ministerial exception ... is not subject to waiver or estoppel.”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Hosanna–Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4.  See also Carl H. 
Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Constraint: Validations and 
Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445, 454-55 (2002) (arguing that a consequence of 
treating the Establishment Clause as a structural provision is that its limitations 
“cannot be waived” the way that personal rights can be waived). 
197 Id. at 836 (“The ministerial exception is a structural limitation imposed on the 
government by the Religion Clauses, a limitation that can never be waived.”). 
198  Id. The Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, has held post-Hosanna-Tabor that a 
religious organization may waive the defense on appeal by failing to raise it in its 
brief.  See Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th 
Cir. 2012).  The court failed to consider the particular character of the ministerial 
exception in reaching this conclusion. For the reasons explained above, we think that 
this is incorrect. 
199 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
200 Id. at 457-59. 
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about the substance of her scholarship, and then litigated the 
questions at trial. As the district court explained, “The parties called 
eighteen witnesses, fourteen of whom were priests or members of a 
religious order, and several were subjected to very vigorous cross-
examination.”201 
 Immediately after the trial but before judgment, Judge 
Oberdorfer asked the parties to brief the question whether the 
resolution of the dispute would violate the First Amendment.202 After 
briefing, Judge Oberdorfer concluded that the Religion Clauses 
precluded him from resolving the core issue in the suit, which was 
whether the plaintiff’s scholarship met the standards of the 
university. 203 In explaining this conclusion, Judge Oberdorfer noted 
that any grant of tenure to the plaintiff would require Vatican consent, 
which would inevitably be based upon the consistency of her 
scholarship with core teachings of the church.204   
 In our view, the court properly raised the ministerial exception 
sua sponte when it became clear that the dispute would turn on the 
substance of the plaintiff’s writing and its consistency with church 
teachings. It is not clear why the university failed to raise the 
ministerial exception, but if the court had treated the defense as 
waived and resolved the substance of the dispute, the court inevitably 
would have violated the Establishment Clause. To resolve the 
plaintiff’s claims, the court necessarily would have been required to 
adjudicate the quality of the plaintiff’s scholarship about canon law, a 
subject that, at least at this university, was a strictly ecclesiastical 
matter.205   
 In this respect, we think that Michael Helfand’s approach is 
entirely wrong. Helfand contends that the ministerial exception is 
                                                 
201 EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 856 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994). 
202 83 F.3d at 459. 
203 Id. at 460. 
204 856 F.Supp. at 9 (“It is possible for a court to compare the quantity of published 
articles and, to some extent, the teaching evaluations. The issue decided by the 
Canon Law Department, the School of Religious Studies, the Faculty Senate and, 
ultimately, the Church authorities, necessarily involves the quality, and hence the 
substance, of her work. That substance is materially religious. In reviewing actions 
on most complex and technical subjects, a trier of fact chooses between competing 
expert opinions. There are such competing expert opinions as to the quality and, 
necessarily, the religious substance of Sister McDonough’s writings in this record. I 
find and conclude that it is neither reasonably possible nor legally permissible for a 
lay trier of fact to evaluate these competing opinions on religious subjects.”). 
205 See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 29, at 134-39. 
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designed solely to protect church autonomy. 206 On this view, there 
should be no bar to adjudication of a strictly and purely ecclesiastical 
question if both parties consent to its adjudication by a civil court.207 
As we have explained, we think that this view is inconsistent with both 
longstanding Establishment Clause norms and the Court’s decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor, which rests on those norms.208 Establishment Clause 
problems cannot be cured by the consent of the parties involved. For 
example, it would violate the Clause to open a class at a public school 
with prayer even if the teacher and every student present, as well as 
their parents, consented to the practice. 209  Similarly, individual 
litigants cannot consent to adjudication of a matter that the 
Establishment Clause withdraws from the competence of a civil court.  
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 As a matter of substantive constitutional law, Hosanna-Tabor 
does not create the broad sphere of church autonomy that its biggest 
proponents or opponents would suggest. Instead, it is a decision that 
focuses solely on a specific set of questions that courts lack competence 
to resolve. That statement of substantive law, however, masks a 
potentially complicated set of procedural questions. The Court’s 
conclusion that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense 
rather than a jurisdictional bar is only the start of an appropriate 
analysis about how to answer those questions.  
 As we have explained, courts should approach those procedural 
questions in light of the underlying justification for the ministerial 
exception. The exception reflects a longstanding constitutional 
limitation on the competence of courts to resolve “strictly and purely 
                                                 
206 See Helfand, supra note 106, at 1923; supra at notes 106-112 and accompanying 
text. 
207 Id.  
208 See supra at notes 58-102 and accompanying text. 
209 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“Neither the fact that the prayer 
may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the 
students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment 
Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both of 
which are operative against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite 
different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The 
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any 
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws 
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
nonobserving individuals or not.”); see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 121, at 121-
22. 
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ecclesiastical” questions.210 To conclude that the exception operates as 
an affirmative defense does not alter this fundamental limitation on 
the authority of secular courts. Any other approach would be 
unfaithful to this limitation. 
 As a practical matter, this means that in litigation between 
religious institutions and their employees, courts may be required to 
manage discovery to resolve threshold questions about the application 
of the ministerial exception before permitting broader discovery.  
Similarly, courts should consider permitting interlocutory appeals of 
trial court decisions that deny motions for summary judgment based 
on the exception. And courts not only should conclude that religious 
institutions do not waive the defense by failing to raise it, but also 
ought to raise it sua sponte when the facts indicate that the exception 
may apply. These departures from the ordinary treatment of 
affirmative defenses are necessary to respect the constitutional 
principles that the Court articulated in Hosanna-Tabor. 
 
                                                 
210 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. at 733. 
